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bind to the junction of duplex 
DNA and single-stranded DNA, 
and recruit RecA protein to the 
SSB–DNA complex. Although the 
mechanism of these loading and 
recruitment steps is not completely 
understood, it is likely that the rate-
limiting nucleation of RecA protein 
is being stimulated via transient, 
direct interactions with these 
proteins. Filament disassembly is 
also regulated. For example, UvrD 
helicase (helicase II) disassembles 
RecA nucleoprotein filaments that 
formed inappropriately. Thus, the 
regulation of the site and timing of 
RecA filament dynamics is achieved 
via coordination with the repair 
machinery.
Why does RecA form a 
nucleoprotein filament? The 
broad spectrum of biological 
functions attributable to RecA 
protein, ranging from the homology 
search of DNA recombination 
to the activation of proteins via 
its co-protease activity, cannot 
be attributed to the action of an 
individual monomer. Rather, it is 
evident that the catalytic unit of 
the RecA function is the highly 
organized filament that assembles 
on DNA. Formation of a highly 
ordered filament on its DNA 
substrate provides a large surface 
where catalysis can occur (‘surface 
catalysis’), where homology 
can be measured and matched 
to a potential complementary 
partner, and where DNA structural 
transitions can be cooperatively 
transmitted over long distances. 
This requirement for a regular 
RecA/Rad51 nucleoprotein filament 
also permits a broad spectrum of 
regulatory control that is needed for 
biological function.
Where can I learn more?
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It is twenty-five years since the posthumous publication of David Marr’s 
book Vision [1]. Only 35 years old when he died, Marr had already 
dramatically influenced vision research. His book, and the series of papers 
that preceded it, have had a lasting impact on the way that researchers 
approach human and computer vision.
Marr’s vision: Twenty-five years onA review at the time of publication 
predicted that “Even if no single 
one of Marr’s detailed hypotheses 
ultimately survives ... [his] lifework 
will have been vindicated when 
neuroscientists cannot understand 
how it was ever possible to doubt 
the validity of his theoretical 
maxims”. Twenty-five years on, 
most would agree that Marr’s 
recipe for investigating human 
vision and, in particular, his 
strategy of dividing the problem 
into different levels of analysis, 
has become unquestioned. At 
the time, Binford, Horn, Minsky, 
Papert, Rumelhart and others had 
been advocating computational 
modelling as a key to 
understanding the brain’s operation 
but Marr brought a number of 
different approaches together, 
made testable predictions, 
provided a framework for tackling 
challenging neuroscientific 
questions and inspired a generation 
of young scientists to study the 
brain and visual processing. 
Born in Essex, England, Marr 
studied mathematics at Trinity 
College, Cambridge, before 
doing his Ph.D. in what would 
now be called ‘computational 
neuroscience’ with Professor 
G.F. Brindley. His doctoral work, 
expressed in a series of three 
important papers [2–4], tied 
together detailed anatomical data 
on the cerebellum, neocortex 
and hippocampus within a 
computational framework. These 
are fundamental papers in the 
field, especially his paper on the 
cerebellum, but Marr now changed 
his focus to vision. He wanted to 
consider specific algorithms, and 
the constraints of the real world 
that made them tractable, rather 
than the processing of neural 
signals in general. One of the central and best 
known ideas in his book is 
the suggestion that the visual 
system generates a sequence 
of increasingly symbolic 
representations of a scene, 
progressing from a ‘primal sketch’ 
of the retinal image, through 
a ‘2½D sketch’ to simplified 
three- dimensional models of 
objects. In a paper with Ellen 
Hildreth [5], he proposed that 
information from cells tuned to 
different spatial frequencies (or 
scales) is combined into ‘tokens’ 
that are likely to correspond 
to real-world entities such as 
an edge. Although there is no 
convincing evidence that the 
particular type of combination 
Marr advocated is carried out in 
the visual system (other proposals 
have more experimental support 
[6]), it is a good example of Marr’s 
approach. “In the theory of visual 
processes, the underlying task 
is to reliably derive properties of 
the world from images of it; the 
business of isolating constraints 
that are both powerful enough 
to allow a process to be defined 
and generally true of the world is 
a central theme of our inquiry” [1]. 
Today, this approach is normal 
practice in computer vision and at 
least a widely accepted mantra in 
biological vision research.
The tokens comprising the 
primal sketch were, Marr argued, 
then used as input to further 
processes such as object 
recognition [7]. Object recognition 
is one of several areas in which 
Marr’s specific ideas about 
implementation have not survived 
well. The current focus in both 
computer and biological vision is 
on matching of high dimensional 
view-invariant descriptors of 
image features [8,9], taking a quite 
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Figure 1. Eliminating ‘false matches’ in the stereo correspondence problem. 
A random dot stereogram at the top shows left and right eyes’ images for crossed or 
uncrossed fusion (pair on the left or right, respectively). Marr and Poggio’s [10] proposal 
for establishing correct correspondences between dots in the two eyes’ images is il-
lustrated below, using only the dots highlighted in red (and dots from the same region 
of the left eye’s image). The algorithm requires matches to be made between dots of the 
same colour, which gives rise to possible correspondences at all the nodes in the net-
work marked by an open circle. Neighbouring matches with the same disparity support 
one another in the network, illustrated schematically by the green arrows (in the paper 
[10], the support extended farther). At the same time, matches along any line of sight 
(dotted lines) inhibit each other (since a ray reaching the eye must have come from only 
one surface). These constraints are sufficient to eliminate all but the correct matches, 
shown here along the main diagonal.different approach from Marr’s 
simplified three- dimensional ‘stick 
figures’.
Of his ‘theoretical maxims’, the 
best known is Marr’s argument that 
problems in neuroscience must 
be tackled at a number of different 
levels: computational theory, 
algorithm and implementation. 
Computational theory means 
making explicit the input and 
output of a process and the 
constraints that would allow 
the problem to be solved. This 
analysis must come first, he 
claimed. The algorithmic level 
describes in more detail how to get from input to output but it 
should be independent of the 
implementation, the third level.
A good example that Marr used 
to illustrate the idea of separate 
computational levels was binocular 
stereopsis. An attractive aspect 
of this problem is that the input 
to the process is well defined (the 
difference between two images) 
and, at least at first glance, so is 
the output. With his colleague, 
Tomaso Poggio, Marr developed 
two stereo algorithms [10,11].
The first of these used a simple 
network that took as its input the 
images from the left and right eyes and which, through a series 
of competitive and cooperative 
interactions, generated a single 
estimate of depth for each point 
on a surface (Figure 1). In the input 
layer of the network there were lots 
of ‘false matches’, where neurons 
would respond to a bright point in 
one image and, by chance, quite 
a different (non-corresponding) 
bright point in the other image.
Neurophysiological studies have 
shown that neurons at the first 
stage of binocular processing in 
the cortex (V1) respond to both 
‘false’ and correct matches [12,13]. 
It is tempting to associate V1 
with the first layer of the network 
in Marr and Poggio’s model, the 
stage before false matches are 
eliminated, and then to search for 
visual areas beyond V1 that have 
characteristics similar to their 
output layer. Although a number 
of studies have suggested that 
responses in other visual areas 
achieve this to some degree 
[14–17], the analogy with Marr and 
Poggio’s model is too simplistic. 
For example, the receptive fields of 
neurons grow larger at each level 
in the hierarchy, with the finest 
scale detail represented in V1. It 
seems likely that observers rely 
on information from neurons in V1 
when carrying out tasks requiring 
the finest spatial resolution. Other 
evidence suggests that false 
targets persist in at least some of 
the putative output areas [18,19]. 
This raises the question of whether 
areas outside V1 really are ‘output 
layers’ to a cooperative algorithm 
after all. If not, do they have 
any more special a role in depth 
perception than V1?
In their second paper on stereo 
vision, Marr and Poggio [11] 
introduced an idea that would 
require a very different type of 
implementation. They proposed 
that the brain stored disparity 
information in a data structure 
that survived eye movements, 
the ‘2½D sketch’. A bit like the 
filing system used on a computer, 
with folders and sub-folders, 
fine-scale information about a 
surface would be stored within 
coarser scale groupings. Their 
model dealt only with vergence eye 
movements, which move the eyes 
from one depth plane to another, 
but a similar idea can be applied 
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that move the eyes around a 
scene. When the observer’s 
task requires a particular piece 
of fine scale detail — to thread 
a needle, for example — some 
store like the 2½D sketch would 
provide the information required 
to direct the eyes (or attention) 
to the appropriate location and 
then access the activity of the 
appropriate fine scale neurons. 
It is hard to see how all this 
information could be stored 
in a single visual cortical area, 
particularly if it is to survive large 
saccadic eye movements as Marr 
discussed towards the end of his 
book. Neurons in V1 and other 
visual areas change their pattern of 
firing as the eyes move, while the 
2½D sketch of the object remains 
constant. If a store of information 
like this does exist in the visual 
system, the implementation is 
likely to be something more like a 
motor plan. In this case, neurons in 
V1 might contribute to stereopsis 
not simply as an input layer but 
also as ‘output neurons’ just 
like those in higher areas. What 
about the ‘false matches’ in V1, 
do these not rule out V1 neurons 
contributing to perception? 
Not necessarily. A filing system 
like the 2½D sketch could help 
determine which V1 neurons carry 
the appropriate information for a 
certain task, making it unnecessary 
to ‘suppress’ the firing of neurons 
responsive to false matches at 
all. There is some psychophysical 
evidence consistent with this idea 
[20]. Indeed, if perception involves 
inferring the state of the world from 
the available evidence, neurons 
responding to ‘false matches’ 
provide valid, informative evidence 
about the scene (for example, 
indicating that there is repetitive 
structure in the stimulus).
Binocular vision, then, 
provides an example in which 
the computational theory and 
algorithms that Marr set out 
a quarter of a century ago 
remain relevant today and still 
inform arguments about the 
implementation of stereopsis in 
the brain. Criticism may be raised 
about details of Marr’s proposals. 
For example, in his 2½D sketch 
it is unclear what the coordinate 
frame is that describes the location of objects — a tricky but crucial 
issue. Similar sparse specification 
and internal inconsistencies have 
been pointed out in Marr’s paper 
on the hippocampus [21]. But 
these critical comments are minor 
in the context of the prolific and 
wide- ranging output he achieved in 
a few years.
Marr’s great strength was his 
capacity to unify ideas: from 
neurophysiology, anatomy 
and psychophysics to image 
processing and computer 
vision. Serious attempts at 
unification are sorely lacking 
in neuroscience today. Had he 
lived, Marr would surely be at 
the centre of a lively debate 
over the best computational 
framework to describe what the 
brain does. Marr’s three papers 
on the neocortex, hippocampus 
and cerebellum remain a shining 
example of an attempt at a grand 
theory. A particular strength 
in this approach (which is less 
evident in his later work on vision) 
was to consider a continuous 
flow of information that includes 
the outside world in the loop. 
Recent interest in the role of the 
cerebellum in cognition [22] may 
provoke interest in modelling visual 
representations as sensori- motor 
loops of this kind. It would be a 
fitting tribute to Marr’s inspirational 
influence in the field if the two 
sides of his work, on neural 
networks and visual processing, 
could be united in a computational 
theory of vision. As ‘systems 
biology’ gathers pace, it is well 
to remember that Marr was one 
of the first to examine the brain 
as a system. His argument for 
understanding the brain through 
computational theory and 
modelling are as relevant as they 
ever were.
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